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Executive Registry

85- 3468

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

11 September 1985

Dear Curt,

Thanks very much for your thoughtful suggestion about diplomatic options for Central American peace and democracy. I am glad you are still thinking constructively, and am having your idea looked at carefully.

Best regards.

Yours,

*Bill*  
William J. Casey

The Honorable Curtin Winsor, Jr.



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SUSPENSE		17 Sept 85 Date			

Remarks

To 7: Please have comments prepared for DCI.

Executive Secretary  
11 Sep 85

Date

STAT

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

85- 3471

11 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:



STAT

FROM:

DCI

SUBJECT:

Letter dated 23 August 1985  
from Ambassador Winsor

Take a look at this and let me know  
what you think.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'C' followed by a horizontal line.

William J. Casey

Attachment:

Letter stated above



C-352

27 AUG 1985

CURTIN WINSOR, JR.




*Personal*

August 23, 1985.


The Hon. William Casey  
DCI  
The Central Intelligence Agency  
McLean, Va. 20505

Dear Bill:

Since my return, I have dedicated a significant amount of my time to thought as to how we might find our way to a policy format for Central America which gives democracy a good chance in Central America (Nicaragua) without need for direct U.S. military involvement. After much reflection, I developed the attached proposal, which is based on an actual Costa Rican proposal and, as an option, a proposal of my own along with a general sequence of what might be done. I offer this to you as a possible positive alternative to the lose - lose course which we seem to be continuing today, with our passive/loss commitment to Contadora, and our insufficient support for the Freedom Fighters. In so much as my welcome at State is doubtful at best, I thought that you might have some interest in this concept. If I can do more for you along these lines please let me know.

 I am off for a week of holidays and will return on September 2nd. Looking forward to keeping in touch and being of service to the cause if I can.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Curt".

Curtin Winsor, Jr.  
former Ambassador to  
Costa Rica: 1983-1985.

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The result of this initiative would be two fold. First, it would recreate a functioning regional market entity. This is key to the survival of certain vital industries including agricultural production, (beans, corn, etc.), industrial production (tires, paper etc.). Such trade would amount to considerably less than 30% of the overall trade of the member countries. This is deemed both healthy and realistic by both AID and private sector people familiar with the Central American region.

Second, should Nicaragua refuse to participate in the newly reconstructed Common Market (as is almost certain,) the Costa Ricans would take the position that they could be declared to be an illegitimate government which is also guilty of aggression through subversion and economic sabotage. Costa Rica would then be willing to move against Nicaragua on these grounds in the OAS. Such movement would include lobbying to reopen the 1979 consultative session of foreign ministers, which delegitimized the regime of Anastio Somoza in 1979. The proposal would be to do the same for the communist sandinistas. Costa Rica would also terminate diplomatic relations with the communist sandinista Government of Nicaragua provided that such action would be complimented by the other Central American States and the United States. It would be understood by the Costa Ricans that they would not move in this direction unless they were able to convince at least two of the Central American countries to do likewise (Salvador and Honduras).

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